To talk – or not to talk
Toolbox
Barrie Dunsmore - Published: March 8, 2009
hroughout history the question of whether to negotiate with your enemies has been a contentious one.
In this country, those who argue that it's a sign of weakness have often prevailed. President John Kennedy's oft-quoted advice in his inaugural address, "We must never negotiate out of fear but we should never fear to negotiate," has been honored in the breach perhaps as much as in the observance.
Over four decades, the epitome of America's hardliners has been Richard Perle, known not so affectionately as the "prince of darkness." Perle recently denied being a neo-conservative or that the neo-cons had played a definitive role in the decision to invade Iraq two assertions that speak loudly to the issue of his credibility.
As a young staffer working for the late Democratic Sen. Henry "Scoop" Jackson, Perle manipulated Jackson's instinctive anti-Soviet attitudes, which led to a fierce debate in the mid-1970s and a setback for the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford policy of "dιtente." During the Reagan administration, Perle was one of the super-hawks in Cap Weinberger's Pentagon. As chairman of the Pentagon's Advisory Board during the Bush II administration, he advocated for the invasion of Iraq and was against talking to Iran.
Considering the track record of Perle and his ilk, one wonders how their policies can still be taken seriously. But the debate goes on.
President Barack Obama has pledged to use diplomacy as a major instrument in his foreign policy and diplomacy usually means talking to your adversaries as well as your friends.
In these early days it is not clear just how far the new administration is prepared to go in terms of talks with Iran. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seemed lukewarm to negotiations when she said privately this past week that she didn't think Iran would respond positively to Obama's suggestions for diplomatic engagement. On the other hand, Clinton has decided to start talking again to the Syrians and has sent two ranking diplomats to Damascus this weekend. This overture could ultimately have implications for American discussions with Iran and for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, which is near death. As for this latter problem, I would argue another dialogue needs to be opened up fairly soon with Hamas, the Palestinian movement that controls Gaza and has ever-growing support in the West Bank.
First a little history. In 1975, when he was negotiating a second disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a secret pact with the Israelis that the United States would have no diplomatic contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization until the PLO changed its charter and recognized Israel's right to exist. At the time Kissinger believed he could do an end run on riff-raff like Yasser Arafat by dealing with Arab kings and non-elected presidents.
That may have been true in 1975, but the ban on substantive contact between American diplomats and the PLO lasted for 12 years. By the time the PLO changed its charter in 1987 and America began to talk to Arafat, the situation in the Middle East had changed dramatically for the worse. There had been an Israeli-Egyptian peace but Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was then assassinated by Islamic militants. Lebanon had been bogged down by more than a decade of civil war which involved the PLO, Iran and Syria. Ultimately the Israelis invaded Lebanon in a failed effort to crush the PLO that instead created a new nemesis for them the Shiite militant movement Hezbollah.
Throughout this period the anger of the Palestinians in the territories occupied by Israel became more intense even as Israeli settlements in those territories continued to grow. If America had been a genuinely even-handed mediator during those 12 years would it have been able to prevent the situation from becoming so intractable? There is no way to know. But historically when the United States was actively engaged as an honest broker trusted by all, it gave the region hope. When it is not so engaged, hope becomes despair.
Which brings us to Hamas. Like the PLO before it, Hamas doesn't recognize Israel's right to exist and uses terror as a weapon. But Hamas is not just a terrorist organization it's a political movement that was, after all, elected by a majority of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. That happened in February 2006, in large measure because Palestinians were fed up with the corruption of the PLO and its inability to reduce the oppressive nature of the Israeli military occupation or to stop the encroachment of Israeli settlements. But Israel, the United States and most of the European Union refused to deal with a Hamas government, calculating Hamas could be coerced into political concessions.
In this atmosphere open warfare broke out in Gaza in June 2007 between Hamas and Arafat's Al Fatah Party. Hamas won that battle and Israel responded by setting up a blockade to restrict or eliminate access to or from Gaza. Egypt closed its side of the border, too. So in effect Gaza was a prison with no trade, no jobs and no hope.
After an uneasy six month truce ended last December, Israel's three week assault on Gaza brought more destruction and misery but did not fundamentally change the struggle with Hamas which continues its rocket attacks on civilian centers in southern Israel.
To break this impasse, America must start dealing with Hamas leaders.
Yes, Hamas uses terror and refuses to recognize Israel. But how does that differ from an Israeli government made up of at least some members (in the next government, perhaps many) who do not recognize the right of a state of Palestine to exist and a government willing to level Gaza to force Hamas to capitulate, even if hundreds of civilians are killed in the process? On the morality scale, I do not see a huge difference.
More important, as a practical matter, there is no way to achieve peace between Israel and the Palestinians unless Hamas is included in the discussions.
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